In a modern technological environment where information systems are characterized by complexity, situations of non-effective operation should be anticipated. Often system failures are a result of insufficient planning or equipment malfunction, indicating that it is essential to develop techniques for predicting and addressing a system failure. Particularly for safety-critical applications such as the healthcare information systems, which are dealing with human health, risk analysis should be considered a necessity. This paper presents a new method for performing a risk analysis study of health information systems. Specifically, the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology (CRAMM) has been utilized for identifying and valuating the assets, threats, and vulnerabilities of the information system, followed by a graphical modeling of their interrelationships using Bayesian Networks. The proposed method exploits the results of the CRAMM-based risk analysis for developing a Bayesian Network model, which presents concisely all the interactions of the undesirable events for the system. Based on ''what-if'' studies of system operation, the Bayesian Network model identifies and prioritizes the most critical events. The proposed risk analysis framework has been applied to a vital signs monitoring information system for homecare telemedicine, namely the VITAL-Home System, developed and maintained for a private medical center (Medical Diagnosis and Treatment S.A.).
Introduction
Nowadays, health delivery practices for specific populations, such as patients suffering from chronic diseases or elderly people, are shifting towards the constant health monitoring; 24 h/day, 7 days per week. Health monitoring may be delivered not only in a hospital environment but at home as well, through the establishment of modern patient telemonitoring systems [1] [2] [3] [4] . The reasons are better possibilities for managing chronic care, controlling health delivery costs, increasing quality of life, and quality of health services and distinct possibility of predicting and thus avoiding serious complications [5] .
Homecare equipment for people with chronic diseases requiring a constant monitoring includes appliances that can work 24 h/day. These computer-based systems are performing safety-critical applications and therefore concentrate the ongoing concern that they might fail and cause harm [6] . In the past, there are examples of computer-based systems providing health care that have failed producing catastrophic results for patientÕs health. The most famous incident is the one regarding Therac-25, a therapeutic computer system intended to heal, but inadvertently killed and harmed patients before being removed of the market [7] .
Furthermore, medical data maintained in health information systems are directly related to the patientÕs health and safety. According to the Recommendation No. R (97) 5 on the Protection of Medical Data issued by the Council of Europe, appropriate technical and organizational measures must be taken to protect personal data against any accidental or illegal destruction, accidental loss, as well as against unauthorized access [8] . These pos-sible threats can damage severely health information system reliability and discourage professionals of future use.
Therefore, the execution of a risk analysis is a necessity to assure a health information systemÕs safety and Quality of Service (QoS). This analysis should clearly specify all the possible risks that may lead to system unavailability or security violation and identify appropriate countermeasures to combat these risks. Several risk analysis methodologies have been proposed in literature, which are currently available in the form of guidelines to be applied manually or through interactive software packages. Furthermore, in most cases these guidelines are combined with modeling techniques that are widely applied in reliability and safety engineering, such as Fault Trees, Event Trees, Markov Chains, and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis) [9] [10] [11] . These techniques provide representation of system operation and undesirable events and validation of system safety level [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .
This paper presents a new method for performing a risk analysis study of a healthcare telemonitoring system. The UK Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) Risk Analysis and Management Methodology (CRAMM) has been applied for identifying the information systemÕs asset values, threats, vulnerabilities, and the corresponding risks [17] . Initially, the user services, offered by the health information system and identified by the CRAMM methodology, are used for the construction of a Fault Tree representing the logical interrelationships of failure events that may lead to a hazardous condition. Finally, these relationships are represented using an advanced Bayesian Network model that provides greater flexibility in modeling failure event scenarios and highlighting system critical areas. The proposed risk analysis framework has been applied to a vital signs monitoring information system for homecare telemedicine, namely the VITAL-Home System, developed and maintained for a private medical center (Medical Diagnosis and Treatment S.A.).
Risk analysis of healthcare information systems
In recent years, the escalating advances in information and communication technologies created many new opportunities, but also an environment with more risks than ever before. Managers, engineers, and information security professionals should evaluate the specific risks in information systems in a concise and systematic way. As far as healthcare information systems are concerned, quality of health services and security of medical data play an important role in the wide acceptance of new technologies by patients and practitioners. Therefore, novel health information systems must be accompanied by a risk analysis, identifying the threats and vulnerabilities of the system and, in some cases, providing a system model of all interrelationships among the various events that influence system safety [15] .
Risk analysis involves the identification and assessment of the levels of risks calculated from the known values of assets and the levels of threats to, and vulnerabilities of, those assets [12, 17] . Furthermore, risk management involves the identification, selection, and adoption of countermeasures justified by the identified risks to assets and the reduction of those risks to acceptable levels. Several methods have been developed and applied to information systems. In the proposed risk analysis method, the main steps of the CRAMM methodology have been adopted [17] . CRAMM is owned, administered, and maintained by the Security Service on behalf of the UK Government. In line with nearly all risk analysis methods, CRAMM asserts that risk is dependent on the asset values, the threats, and the vulnerabilities. Moreover, it enables the practitioner to build a system model encapsulating the asset interdependencies; it provides useful insights into system operational characteristics as well as a comprehensive identification of which assets are at greatest risk, due to what threats, and with what impacts should those threats succeed.
Specifically, the CRAMM methodology is organized in three main stages. First, system assets are identified and categorized as data, application software, and physical assets (equipment, buildings, and staff). Data assets are valued in terms of their impacts on breaches of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation, which are the widely accepted principles of information security. Application and physical assets are valued in terms of their unavailability, replacement or reconstruction cost. The likely threats and known vulnerabilities are quantified against selected asset groups, while their likelihood of occurrence is estimated using predefined levels of threat and vulnerability (e.g., ''Very Low,'' ''Low,'' ''Medium,'' ''High,'' and ''Very High''). Finally to manage the identified risks, a set of countermeasures applicable to the information system is produced.
Modeling system safety: Fault Trees vs Bayesian Networks

Basic principles of the Fault Trees
Fault Tree analysis was originally introduced to facilitate the safety analysis of system designs by providing insight into system operation and illuminating potential weaknesses, with respect to reliability or safety [10, 12] . A Fault Tree system model is a graphical representation of logical interrelationships between undesirable events, leading to a hazardous system state [18] . It depicts the combinations of undesirable events that lead to the hazardous system state (top event) by means of their logical-gate interrelationships. The quantitative analysis of a Fault Tree is used to determine the probability of occurrence of the top event, given the respective probabilities for the undesirable events. From a system design perspective, the Fault Tree analysis provides a logical framework for understanding the ways in which a system can fail, which is often as important as understanding how a system can succeed.
The analyst constructing a Fault Tree begins with an undesirable scenario being considered, and decomposes the corresponding symptom into its possible causes. Each possible cause is then investigated and further refined until the primary events are identified. The primary events are the undesirable events that are not further developed into possible causes in the present analysis, such as component failures, missed actuation signals, human errors. The primary events constitute the limit of resolution of the Fault Tree analysis. The combinations of the fewest primary events that bring on the top event, if they occur simultaneously, are called minimal cutsets.
The resolution of the top event into its constituent causes and further down to the primary events is generally implemented by logical AND-OR gates. The use of other types of logical gates such as NOT, XOR requires a different quantitative approach with increased computational effort. The qualitative analysis aims at relating the top event with the primary events in a concise and systematic way. Therefore, based on the process of Boolean reduction of a set of equations, the top event is expressed as the unification of the minimal cutsets, which in turn equal to the intersection of their constituent primary events:
where TE is the top event, MCS i is the ith minimal cutset, n is the total number of minimal cutsets, P j is the jth primary event, and A i is the set of primary event indices that comprise minimal cutset i. For example, if a Fault Tree has 30 primary events P 1 -P 30 , and MCS 2 may be consisted of primary events P 2 , P 7 , and P 10 , then A 2 = {2,7,10} and these are the values of j. The quantitative analysis represents a calculation of the top event probability. Considering the assumption that the primary events are mutually independent, the top event probability of failure Q TE is calculated as
where Q MCSi is the probability of failure of the minimal cutset i and Q Pj is the primary eventÕs j probability of failure and A i is the set of primary event indices that comprise minimal cutset i. Moreover, certain importance measures can be calculated for the minimal cutsets and the primary events to pinpoint their impact on the occurrence of the top event. As proposed by Fussel-Vesely, the importance measures for each minimal cutset MCS, I MCS and for each component i, I i can be defined as
where Q MCS is the probability of occurrence of minimal cutset MCS, Q j is the probability of occurrence of the jth cutset which contains component i, m is the number of minimal cutsets that contain component i, and Q TE is the top event probability of occurrence [12] .
Basic principles of the Bayesian Networks for modeling cause-effect relationships
Bayesian Networks are a set of methods for graphical representation and probabilistic calculation for most problems characterized by uncertainty [19] . Bayesian Networks consist of a set of variables and a set of directed edges between variables, and they are very effective in representing possible ''cause-effect'' relationships. The variables that affect another variableÕs state (''child'') are called ''parents''. The variables that have no parents are called root variables. In the generic case, Bayesian NetworksÕ variables can be either discrete or continuous. In the case of discrete variables, each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. The states of the ''child'' variable X i with parents B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n (n > 1) are described by an attached conditional probability table P (X i j B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n ). For the variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n of a Bayesian Network the probability of the joint event X 1 ÙX 2 Ù Á Á Á ÙX n is given by
where Parent (X i ) is the set of parent variables of the variable X i . In Fig. 1A 0 , a simple Bayesian Network with discrete variables is depicted with three parent and one child node while in Fig. 1B 0 the conditional probability table of the child node is presented.
Building and using a Bayesian Network consisting of discrete variables is essentially a three-stage process. The first stage includes the determination of the variables and their cause-effect relationships, while the second stage includes the specifications of each variable stateÕs conditional probability, given the state of the parent variables. The third stage is inference, during which the input data is entered to the Bayesian Network model and the probabilities for all Network nodes are calculated according to the cause-effect relationships. Furthermore, Bayesian inference includes the calculation of the posterior probabilities for the variable states given a system fault or a certain combination of events, the joint probability of combination of variable states and the determination of the most probable combination of variable states. 
Modeling issues of Fault Trees and Bayesian Networks
Fault Trees are very popular in dependability modeling, system reliability analysis, evaluation of large safety-critical systems, and graphical representation of cause-effect relationships in risk analysis [10, 12, 18] . They are constructed using a top-down approach, from the events to their causes, until no further decomposition is possible or required, and the primary events are identified. The methodology is based on several assumptions. The events are considered binary (two possible states) and statistically independent, while relationships between events and causes are represented by means of logical AND-OR gates. Currently, several new Fault Tree tools relax the last assumption, while introducing considerable computational effort in the quantitative analysis of the Fault Tree models [18, 20] . The Fault Tree model provides a framework for the estimation of occurrence probability regarding the undesirable top event and the minimal cutsets and the importance measures provide indications for the events of the highest risk for system safety. However, Bayesian Networks provide greater flexibility in representing uncertain data and investigating different system operational scenarios [21, 22] .
The Bayesian Networks is a widely used modeling technique for representing uncertain knowledge in probabilistic systems. The exciting feature of this technique is that it is possible to include local conditional dependencies into the model, by directly specifying the causes that influence a given effect, and therefore contribute significantly in fault diagnosis and risk prioritization. Furthermore, Bayesian Networks provide the flexibility of modeling events with more than two possible states, while other operational dependencies in system modeling such as common cause failures, sequentially dependent failures can be modeled more easily than using the Fault Tree formalism. In the context of the present risk analysis framework, the use of Bayesian Networks provides a concise graphical representation of the cause-effect interrelationships among threats, vulnerabilities, and assets in the risk analysis of information systems, while the conditional dependencies among the events and the probabilistic inference of the Bayesian Network aim significantly in a more realistic risk prioritization of the undesirable events for system safety. The importance measures of the Fault Tree method are calculated arbitrarily of the existence or not of the top event or any other possible evidence for the tree events. However, the conditional probabilities given the existence or not of certain events incorporate this evidence in their calculation and result in a more realistic ranking of primary events [21] .
The VITAL-Home patient monitoring system
Home offers a considerably different environment compared to a hospital or to a health care unit. Facilities for medical practice at home are limited by the availability of portable patient monitors for such applications. These new systems provide automated connection with remote access and seamless transmission of biological and other data. The patient or elder will mainly require monitoring of his vital signals (i.e., ECG, blood pressure, heart rate, breath rate, oxygen saturation, and perspiration) [3, [24] [25] [26] [27] . Patients recently discharged from hospital after some form of intervention, for instance, after a cardiac episode, cardiac surgery or a diabetic comma are less secure and require enhanced care. The most common forms of special home monitoring are ECG arrhythmia monitoring, post surgical monitoring, respiratory, and blood oxygen levels monitoring and sleep apnoea monitoring.
VITAL-Home system is a patient monitoring system, aiming at fulfilling this gap in the continuation and coordination of healthcare after the patient leaves the hospital and returns to his home. The architectural model of the VITAL-Home system is depicted in Fig. 2 .
The VITAL-Home model is architecturally divided into two different operational subsystems. The first serves the purpose of acquiring and encoding vital signs and it is located at the patientÕs home. This part of the system is duplicated for each patient. The second collects, through a communication link, the vital signs to decode, monitor, process, and store them. This is located at the Healthcare Center providing the ''Monitoring Service.'' A Portable Vital Signs Monitor (PVSM) and corresponding biosensors are located at the patientÕs home, measuring bio-signals. The PVSM equipments are connected through a Bluetooth link to a personal computer, also located at the patientÕs home, transferring all recorded vital signs to the PC. The encoded medical data will be stored locally in the PC. PatientÕs medical data may be transferred to the Health Care Center (HCC) either through a fixed line (i.e., PSTN, ISDN, and ADSL), or a mobile channel such as GPRS, or UMTS.
At the HCC site there is a central server that collects, decodes, monitors, processes, and stores the vital signs transmitted by the remote patientÕs locations. In terms of the communication equipment, the infrastructure is similar to that described for the patientÕs home.
The applications that are hosted in the HCC central server are:
• The VITAL-DICOM decoder software, allowing the decoding of vital signs received by patients.
• The Electronic Health Record software, for maintaining patientÕs identification and other demographic information, as well as for storing and processing his medical history and the vital signs generated while using the VITAL-Home service.
• The Vital Signs Monitoring software that will facilitate the display of vital signs on the serverÕs screen, thus enabling the remote monitoring of patientÕs health.
• The Logging software that will record all voice communication between the HCC and patients or attending doctors.
In the following two sections, all the reliability aspects of the previously described VITAL-Home system are explored and analyzed based on the proposed risk analysis framework.
Risk analysis of the VITAL-Home system
The risk analysis of the VITAL-Home system, in accordance to the guidelines of the CRAMM methodology, has been performed by experienced CRAMM-certified risk analysts. However, several key persons of the service provider (Medical Diagnosis and Treatment S.A.) have actively participated in the study by providing, through interviews or questionnaires, the information required by the analysts. It should be stressed at this point, that the risk analysts have presented the results of each stage to the management of the medical center, to get their agreement and also obtain their permission to proceed with the study.
The first stage of the VITAL-Home system risk analysis comprises of the identification and the valuation of the information systemÕs assets. Valuation concerns the data maintained by the HCC and the patient, as well as the hardware and software applications used for the provision of the VITAL-Home service. The risk analyst decides the level of granularity for the identification of the information systemÕs assets, in accordance to the CRAMM guidelines. However, the main approach is to identify, as distinct assets, all data categories that may disrupt the user service if their availability, confidentiality or integrity is compromised. The hardware and software assets are those associated with the aforementioned data categories and thus with the offered user service. The valuation was performed on the basis of the possible impacts that a threat may cause to the HCC and the patient.
Data assets
It should be noted that since the VITAL-Home system deals with medical data (confidential information) and it is directly related with the safety of the patient, the security, trust, and reliability are the key ÔservicesÕ of the HCC to the patients. Therefore, a security incident is not just an internal problem of the HCC (replacement cost) but has an immediate effect on the trust of patients to the system and thus to the capability of the HCC to offer reliable Healthcare Services. Therefore, the data valuation was done by estimating the impact that could be caused by the loss of data availability and/or data confidentiality and/or data integrity, always considering the worst case scenario. The identified data assets of the VITAL-Home system were categorized into the following classes: Patient Medical Records, Encoded Vital Signs, Reporting Data, and Voice-Log Data.
Hardware assets
The hardware assets required at both the HCC site and at patientÕs home are: 1. HCC Server. This is the main network host station that stores the patient medical records, receives vital signs from patients, and facilitates their decoding and monitoring through specialized monitoring software. In addition, it supports logging of all communications between the HCC and the attending doctors, hospitals, or patients. 2. HCC Printers. These are a color inkjet printer for printing vital signs, and a laser printer for printing normal reports and letters. 3. Backup Media. These are magnetic tapes for back-up of the data stored on the HCC Server. 4. PatientÕs Home PC. This is the PC that will be installed at the patientÕs location for facilitating the encoding of the vital signs and their transmission to the HCC. 5. PatientÕs PVSM. These are the medical devices and sensors recording vital signs. 6. PTT Telephone Line. This is a normal line (Fixed, Cable or DSL) through which the patient can transmit the vital signs to the HCC or communicate with the doctors. 7. GPRS or UMTS or Satellite device. This device is used as a back-up in the case that the conventional telephone line is unavailable. 8. Internet Line. This is the line used to connect the HCC to the Internet through an Internet Service Provider. 9. Communication Protocol. This will be the TCP/IP protocol that will be used for any type of communication. 10. HCC Modem. This is the Modem that will be installed at the HCC for supporting data collection from the remote patient locations through the fixed line. 11. PatientÕs Home Modem. This is the Modem (Fixed, Cable or DSL) that will be installed at the patientÕs home for supporting data transmission to the HCC through the fixed line.
The total value of the hardware assets has been estimated on a replacement cost basis and it is not expected to exceed the amount of 22,000 Euro.
Software assets
The software assets required for the provision of the VITAL-Home service are the following: The total value of the software assets has been estimated on a replacement cost basis and it is not expected to exceed the amount of 38,000 Euro.
Evaluation of the threats
The next step is the evaluation of the threats that the system is facing, as well as the identification of the vulnerabilities that may allow some threats to occur. These, in turn, will provide us with the security-related needs of the users. The evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities in conjunction with the systemÕs asset valuation are used to calculate the risk level of each system asset. The following table presents the important threats that the VITAL-Home system is facing, together with the corresponding user needs they lead to.
The threats presented in Table 1 can be analyzed further down to more detailed causes. For example, ''masquerading user identity'' may be directed by insiders or outsiders of the VITAL-Home system, therefore the threat can be modeled as a result of these two causes. Apart from the tabular form representation, the cause-effect interrelationships of threats, vulnerabilities and assets of the VITALHome system can be represented in detail using dependability modeling techniques, such as the Fault Trees [16, 10] . The basic services that constitute the successful system operation are identified and their unavailability is analyzed to its causes in a top-down approach, using logical AND-OR gates to model the causality. In the present case study, the basic services of the VITAL-Home system can be summarized in the following four operations: where the specific details about each one of them have been given previously. The unavailability of any of these services will lead to the VITAL-Home system failure to satisfy the specifications, which is a fact depicted by the logical-OR gate of Fig. 3 .
The four basic services can be further decomposed down to the events leading to their unavailability, using the findings of the CRAMM analysis. The primary events of the Fault Trees are the threats identified in the CRAMM analysis that can be no further decomposed, or their further investigation is far beyond the scope of the analysis. In  Fig. 4 , the Fault Tree of Home Monitoring Service is presented, where all the cause-effect interactions leading to the service unavailability are modeled using logical AND-OR gates. This Fault Tree is an illustrative way to map all the undesirable events and their interactions leading to Home Monitoring Service unavailability, while any possible estimation for the probability of these events may lead to an estimation for the service unavailability, based on the Fault Tree semantics described above. However, the Fault Tree model provides limited modeling capabilities comparing to other dependability modeling techniques, such as the Bayesian Networks, as far as fault diagnosis or criticality ranking are concerned [18, 21, 22] . Furthermore, Bayesian Networks provide an excellent environment for exploiting any possible statistical data or evidence for failure diagnosis or risk prioritization. The proposed methodology combines the detailed risk analysis of information systems with a Bayesian Network modeling of the interrelationships among threats, vulnerabilities and assets, to illustrate the results of the risk analysis and introduce risk prioritization based on the Bayesian Networks semantics.
Bayesian Network modeling of the VITAL-Home system and results
Bayesian Networks have long been applied in real-world tasks since they provide a robust probabilistic method for modeling under uncertainty. In the present context, Bayesian Networks provide an excellent way for mapping the findings of the risk analysis in a concise and illustrative model. The root nodes of the network represent the threats identified in the CRAMM analysis, which are no further decomposed to their causes. These threats are related to undesirable events for system operation and the interrelationships can be expressed using the logical AND-OR formalism employed in Fault Trees. In other words, the conditional probability tables of the child nodes are constructed based on the Boolean logic of the AND-OR gates i.e., a child node representing an AND node will be in the ÔTrueÕ state if and only if all the parent nodes are in the ÔTrueÕ state. The proposed Bayesian Network framework can incorporate even more complex probabilistic interrelationships, such as ''noisy-or'' logical relationships or common cause failures [19] [20] [21] .
The threats identified during the CRAMM risk analysis can be categorized according to their probability of occurrence in five different levels, characterized as ''Very Low,'' ''Low,'' ''Medium,'' ''High,'' and ''Very High,'' while each of these levels can be described by three different sublevels. The engineering expertise acquired during system operation as it is expressed by the information acquired during interviews and questionnaires, and the existing specification reliability data for the hardware threats aim significantly in the estimation of their probability of occurrence. These values can be used in the Bayesian Network model of the information system to estimate the posterior probabilities of failure events during certain scenarios of system operation. Risk prioritization of the threats can be based on these ''what-if'' studies since their likelihood of occurrence is estimated given the occurrence of an undesirable event for system operation. The findings of the VITAL-Home system risk analysis have been modeled as a Bayesian Network. The model has been implemented using the software package MSBNx [23] . The nodes of the network present the threats or undesirable events in general that have been explored during the risk analysis. The threats that are closely related are grouped and influence a child node of a resulting undesirable event to build a modular and flexible network. For example, as it is depicted in Fig. 5 , the communication network unavailability (node ''Net'') is a child node influenced by the unavailability of the two communication networks (Mobile and Fixed), which in turn is influenced by the unavailability of their corresponding line and service. Furthermore in Fig. 6 , the part of the Bayesian Network that models the threats influencing the successful operation of the server and their interactions is presented.
Using the Bayesian Network semantics, the most critical threats can be identified, given the fact that the VITALHome system has failed, by calculating the posterior probabilities of the node-states. Furthermore, the four basic services of the VITAL-Home system can be further investigated, by assuming that each one has failed and calculating the posterior probabilities of occurrence for the threats.
These ''what-if'' studies have been executed, the top seven threats have been ranked according to their posterior probabilities of occurrence and the results are depicted in Table 2 .
The most critical threat for the VITAL-Home system and each of the basic services is the power failure of the server, while the power failure of the home PC is the second most critical failure for the VITAL-Home system, the Home Monitoring Service and the HCC Patient Communication Service. The deficiency of power supply is mainly rooted from sudden interruptions or low power quality (high harmonics of load current, voltage sags etc), which are usual phenomena in islands or areas isolated from the main power grid. A possible countermeasure for power failures is the use of a UPS in combination with a small generating unit on the single site of the server, while the home PC power supply reliability can be improved by the use of a UPS since it is characterized by an acceptable cost. The implementation of these countermeasures will significantly limit the vulnerability of the system by the air-conditioning failure, which is a high-risk failure for the HCC Furthermore, high-risk threats for the VITAL-Home system are ''system and network software failure of Portable Vital Signs Monitoring'', ''Monitor support software failure'' and ''medical record software failure''. The Portable Vital Signs Monitor (PVSM) is located at the patientÕs site and it receives the critical input data for the whole VITAL-Home system, while ''Monitor Support Software'' supports the display of vital signs on the HCC monitor and the medical record software manage personal data of the patients. A high level of reliability must characterize these services since they are at the final stage of the VITALHome system operation and physicians depend very much on the output of these services, with limited chances to verify the obtained results. Therefore, a possible countermeasure to combat these threats is the extensive implementation of verification and validation procedures during the development and maintenance of these software units, which should be also applied periodically during the field operation of the VITAL-Home system, to detect any deviations timely and calibrate the system accordingly. This countermeasure may be implemented also to the VITAL-DICOM Encoder and Decoder software, whose failures appear to be two other high-risk threats. Furthermore, another possible countermeasure is the periodic backup of the medical data and patientÕs records managed by the system for a quick and reliable restoration in case of a possible software failure and loss of data. In Table 2 , there are a number of high-risk threats related to the human factor, such as user errors in using the software assets of the VITAL-Home system and ''Masquerading the User Identity'' during system operation. These threats may result in erratic input to the system and deterioration of system confidentiality, which may discourage physicians and patients of further use. There are a number of possible countermeasures to limit the vulnerability of the VITAL-Home system to these threats, such as proper training of the VITAL-Home system users and enhanced security options for system operation.
Finally, in Table 3 a more detailed of list of threats as they are ranked by the Bayesian Network model given the VITAL-Home system has failed. A corresponding list is constructed for each of the five basic system services, which the results of Table 2 stem from.
Conclusions
Healthcare information and patient monitoring systems are safety-critical applications managing and processing valuable personal information of patients. Risk analysis and management of such systems is a necessity, to improve the quality of the provided services and encourage the implementation of technology in new areas of application. An improved methodology has been presented that combines basic features of the CRAMM risk analysis method with the Bayesian Network modeling technique to identify assets, threats and vulnerabilities of patient telemonitoring systems and present these interrelationships in a concise and flexible model. The Bayesian Network semantics support the representation of complex interactions among and has been compared to classical dependability modeling techniques, such as the Fault Trees.
A patient monitoring system (VITAL-Home) was presented and the systemÕs assets, threats and vulnerabilities have been thoroughly analyzed using the basic features of the CRAMM risk analysis framework. The findings of the analysis have been used to develop a Bayesian Network model to rank the threats with the highest risk, based on their posterior probability of occurrence in the case of the basic services and system failure. The proposed model provides the ability to perform complicated inferences by exploiting any possible evidence of system operation, while it is characterized by a flexibility of modeling more complicated dependencies in any future system modifications. The power supply failure of VITAL-Home systemÕs server and patientÕs home PCs were detected as the highest risk threats. Moreover, threats concerning failures in certain software modules, user errors or data security exhibit also high risk. Several countermeasures were suggested to limit the vulnerability of the VITAL-Home system operation to these threats, such as the adoption of UPS devices or small power generating units, extensive monitoring of the softwareÕs impeccable operation by testing, verification, and validation procedures, backup of medical data, training for the users of the VITAL-Home system and adoption of strict security options. Table 3 Ranking of the VITAL-Home system threats based on the Bayesian Network conditional probabilities
